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I.  Introduction 
Richard J. Wilson provides an invaluable insider’s account of international law in the case 
of Omar Khadr.1 A number of themes in his troubling essay are worthy of further reflection. 
This Comment focuses on the kids before Khadr, the Haitian children whose dangerous 
escape by sea from their violent, impoverished homeland ended in military custody on 
Guantanamo. While other Guantanamo narratives have examined the important 
constitutional and law of war precedents such as Johnson v. Eisentrager,2 it was the Haitian 
refugees’ legal struggles in the 1990s that set the stage for the post-9/11 litigation over what 
rights, if any, could be claimed by Khadr and other non-U.S. citizens held there. 
Less than a decade before sixteen-year-old Omar Khadr was transported to Guantanamo 
in chains—one of only a handful of minors detained there as enemy combatants3—thousands 
of children whose only “crime” was to seek asylum were held captive on the naval base to 
prevent their onward journey to the United States. While the total enemy combatant 
population peaked at 680 in May 2003,4 nearly 47,000 Cubans and Haitians were confined at 
Guantanamo in 1994.5 The past decade of furious legal battles over enemy combatants 
imprisoned at Guantanamo6 has obscured its origins as a detention site for asylum seekers 
from the Caribbean, and distorted our sense of the continuities between the pre-9/11 era and 
our own.7 
John Yoo and other legal architects of the current enemy combatant camp were well aware 
of the history of failed litigation on behalf of Guantanamo’s asylum seekers, and relied on the 
precedents set in the 1990s to conclude, erroneously as it turns out, that the government 
would almost certainly be shielded from habeas cases brought by the newly imprisoned 
                                                                                                                               
 1. Richard J. Wilson, Omar Khadr: Domestic and International Litigation Strategies for a Child in 
Armed Conflict Held at Guantanamo, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 29 (2012). 
 2. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 3. Like much else about Guantanamo, the terminology for those held there is contested. The range of 
opinion is outside the scope of this Comment, so, following the usage of the Supreme Court, I will 
refer to them as enemy combatants. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 724 (2008). 
 4. Guantanamo Bay Timeline, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/timeline/ 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2012). Guantanamo reached its peak population of 680 on May 9, 2003. Id. The 
camp has processed 779 detainees in total, but 680 was the largest number there at one time. Id. At 
the time this piece goes to press, the enemy combatant camp population is 166. The Guantánamo 
Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/held?page=3 (last visited 
Dec. 6, 2012). 
 5. See Fabiola Santiago, No Way Out: Cubans Feel Frustrated, Forgotten, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 1994, 
at A1 (reporting that Guantanamo held 31,000-plus Cubans, including 3086 under the age of 
eighteen, of which 295 were under the age of two and that there were seventy-eight male and five 
female Cuban unaccompanied minors); Rachel L. Swarns, U.S. Faltered as ‘Foster Parent’ to Haitian 
Kids, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 1995, at A1 (reporting that nearly 16,000 Haitians were detained at 
Guantanamo in the summer of 1994). 
 6. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Detention Debates, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2012) (“U.S. detention 
programs have spawned more than 200 different lawsuits producing 6 Supreme Court decisions, 4 
major pieces of legislation, at least 7 executive orders across 2 presidential administrations, more 
than 100 books, 231 laws review articles (counting only those with the word “Guantanamo” in the 
title), dozens of reports by nongovernmental organizations, and countless news and analysis articles 
from media outlets in and out of the mainstream.”) (citations omitted). 
 7. For an analysis drawing the connection in the context of the Uighur detainees, see Ernesto 
Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law: An Extraterritorial Constitution 
in a Plenary Power World, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 193 (2012). 
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there.8 Revisiting the story behind those cases sheds light on the legal process by which even 
children are deprived of their rights when forcibly transferred to Guantanamo.9 
The issue of children on Guantanamo remains relevant even though, as far as we know, no 
new enemy combatants have been brought to the naval base since March 2008, because the 
United States maintains a robust interdiction program in the Caribbean, with no special 
provision for minors.10 Most interdicted asylum seekers are returned directly to their 
countries of origin without an assessment of their claims to refugee status. A very few 
manage to convince the U.S. Coast Guard, by means of the aptly named “shout test,” that 
they would be in grave danger if returned home.11 Those few are then taken to Guantanamo 
for an indefinite period, while U.S. officials seek a third country willing to accept them.12 The 
hidden detainee population of Guantanamo is thus made up of refugees, or “protected 
migrants” in U.S. government terminology.13 
Part II introduces the themes of Wilson’s paper that are explored in this Comment. 
Part III sketches the story of Haitians and Cubans seeking asylum in the United States in 
the 1990s. Part IV sums up the ensuing litigation, which resulted in a firm endorsement by 
the judicial branch of essentially unlimited executive power on Guantanamo. Part V 
compares Wilson’s conclusions on the role of the international law in the Khadr case to mine 
regarding the Haitian unaccompanied minors. 
II.  Khadr’s Childhood and International Law 
Wilson’s important contribution is to explore the operation of international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law in analyzing and deciding the legal issues in Khadr’s 
case, emphasizing how his status as a minor was addressed or ignored by the many actors 
                                                                                                                               
 8. See Memorandum for William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Def. from Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen. Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 1, 6 (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Possible Habeas Jurisdiction Memo], 
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20011228.pdf.  
 9. While Boumediene established the availability of constitutional habeas, its promise remains 
unfulfilled as a result of the subsequent jurisprudence of the D.C. Circuit. 
 10. See Alien Migrant Interdiction, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp (last modified Dec. 7, 2012). 
 11. In keeping with the low public profile of the Caribbean interdiction program’s protection-related 
aspect, information on it is not readily available. The Coast Guard website states merely that 
“[d]uring the course of migrant interdictions, Coast Guard crews may encounter migrants 
requesting protection,” and notes that the Department of State and the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services “establish the policies in this area and handle all potential asylum cases on 
our cutters.” Id. The websites of the Department of State and the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services do not reference this information. However, as part of a U.S. Commemoration 
Pledge for the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in 
December 2011, the United States pledged to “implement updated training to U.S. Coast Guard law 
enforcement personnel participating in migrant interdiction operations by the end of the calendar 
year 2012.” UNHCR/DIV. OF INT’L PROTECTION, PLEDGES 2011: MINISTERIAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
EVENT ON REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS 127 (2011), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/commemorations/Pledges2011-preview-compilation-analysis.pdf. This training 
“will focus on identifying manifestations of fear by interdicted migrants.” Id. 
 12. Sonia R. Farber, Forgotten at Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision and Its Implications for 
Refugees at the Base under the Obama Administration, 98 CAL. L. REV. 989, 990–91 (2010).  
 13. Id. at 990 n.5 (citation omitted). 
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involved. His sobering conclusions are that Khadr’s youth was nearly always considered to be 
legally irrelevant, and that international law almost never played a role in the decisions that 
people made about him. Wilson’s thoughts on why this was so will be taken up in Part V, as 
they resonate in important ways with the situation of an earlier generation of children on 
Guantanamo. 
Wilson situates Khadr as a son and a brother, as well as a child in armed conflict. Born in 
Canada on September 19, 1986,14 Khadr was fifteen years old when he was taken into 
custody by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in July 2002. As Wilson points out, Khadr was a child 
at that time, and at the time of any alleged or admitted criminal conduct. He was sixteen 
years old when transferred to Guantanamo in October 2002,15 and was twenty-four in 
October 2010 when he pled guilty to multiple war crimes and received a forty-year sentence. 
The terms of his plea agreement provide that he will serve no more than eight years, with no 
credit given for the more than eight years he had already spent in Bagram and 
Guantanamo.16 He was transferred to serve the remainder of his prison term in Canada in 
September 2012.17 
Khadr’s situation was taken up in a wide array of forums, including United States and 
Canadian federal courts and administrative bodies, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, and various actors in the United Nations system, including UNICEF, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Children in Armed Conflict.18 Wilson played a key role in much of this advocacy. 
His essay reflects on how it was that Khadr’s childhood was lost, not only in the actual sense 
of the word once he became embroiled in armed conflict, but also in the legal and extra-legal 
universe he came to inhabit. 
It might seem that Khadr’s young life in Canada, Afghanistan and Pakistan would have 
little in common with those of Haitian children in the 1990s, but in addition to the experience 
of being held captive on Guantanamo, there are some striking consistencies between the story 
of Omar Khadr in the early 2000s and those of Haitian children a decade earlier. As a 
preliminary but vital matter, Wilson observes the difficulty of deciding what constitutes the 
full factual context of the “Khadr case.” He points out that a complete presentation of Khadr’s 
story is either forbidden or contested, due to litigation and limitations on almost all 
information. Even the exact number of children in armed conflict who have been held at 
Guantanamo since 2002 is not clear. This secrecy is a particularly characteristic aspect of 
                                                                                                                               
 14. MICHELLE SHEPHARD, GUANTANAMO’S CHILD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF OMAR KHADR 27 (2008). 
 15. Memorandum for Commander, United States Southern Command from Major Gen. Geoffrey D. 
Miller, Dept. of Def., Recommendation to Retain under DoD Control for Guantanamo Detainee, 
Omar Ahmed Khadr ¶ 2 (Jan. 24, 2004), available at 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/766-omar-khadr. 
 16. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD Announces Sentence for Detainee Omar Khadr (Oct. 31, 
2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=14023. 
 17. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Sept. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?Releaseid=15592.  
 18. See generally Wilson, supra note 1. 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2012) 
86 
Guantanamo’s other detainees today, with the government reluctant to reveal the number of 
refugees currently held there, much less their age, gender, or nationality.19 
The following section traces how the policies and practices of the United States on 
Guantanamo in response to asylum seekers from the Caribbean in the 1990s informed its 
approach both to enemy combatants after 9/11 and to today’s refugees. 
III. How the Haitian Children Came to Guantanamo and Lost Their 
 Rights 
The story begins in 1981 with the Reagan Administration’s decision to prevent Haitians 
from traveling without permission to the United States by interdicting their boats in 
international waters and returning them to Haiti.20 Then, as now, many Haitians hoping to 
come to the United States are seeking to rejoin family members, or to find better educational 
and economic opportunities. Others flee Haiti because they fear persecution. The latter are 
protected by international and U.S. law, which forbids the return of refugees to persecution.21 
This prohibition on return is often expressed in its French formulation as the principle of non-
refoulement, a term which eventually caused great confusion for the Supreme Court. States, 
including the United States, are obliged to determine whether a non-citizen claiming asylum 
is in fact a refugee, who cannot be returned home, or a migrant, who lacks such legal 
protection and therefore can be returned. 
The interdiction program, which remains in place to this day, seeks to prevent both deaths 
at sea and unauthorized arrivals in the United States. Officials are concerned to reduce not 
only the “magnet effect,” whereby the possibility of entry into the United States encourages 
risky departures in unsafe vessels, but also the administrative and sometimes judicial costs of 
detaining the Haitians in the United States and determining the merits of their claims to 
refugee status. As the U.S. Coast Guard website helpfully explains, “[i]nterdicting migrants 
at sea means they can be quickly returned to their countries of origin without the costly 
processes required if they successfully enter the United States.”22 
Since 9/11, national security has provided an additional rationale for Haitian interdiction 
and detention. Attorney General John Ashcroft concluded in 2003 that mandatory detention 
for all Haitians who reach the United States by boat (that is, having eluded interdiction) was 
necessary to discourage their compatriots and to keep the number of asylum seekers low.23 
Although Haitians themselves are not generally considered to be prone to terrorism, Ashcroft 
                                                                                                                               
 19. Farber, supra note 12, at 993 (“The availability of public information regarding the refugees at 
Guantánamo is extremely limited. . . . [T]he refugees at Guantánamo are a well-kept secret that the 
government quietly manages in the face of heated debated and vigorous litigation over 
Guantánamo.”).  
 20. Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Exec. Order No. 12, 324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (Sept. 29, 1981). 
 21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (A refugee is a person who is outside his or her country of origin and is 
unable or unwilling to return to it, due to a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”); Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223. 
 22. Alien Migrant Interdiction, supra note 10. 
 23.  D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 579 (2003) (interim decision denying bond pending removal), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoia/bia/Decisions/Revdec/pdfDEC/3488.pdf. 
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underscored the elastic post-9/11 logic of deterrence by opining that “surges in . . . illegal 
migration by sea injure national security by diverting valuable Coast Guard and DOD 
resources from counterterrorism and homeland security responsibilities.”24 
The 1981 interdiction policy was careful to account for the possibility that some of the 
Haitians interdicted might be refugees, and could not simply be taken back to Port-au-Prince 
against their will, by emphasizing the need for “strict observance” of U.S. obligations under 
international and domestic law.25 U.S. officials were therefore instructed to conduct an 
assessment, or screening,26 to determine the dangers that interdicted individuals might face, 
and to refrain from returning those at risk.27 During interdiction’s first decade from 1981 to 
1991, the number of Haitians who were screened in so that they could pursue a full asylum 
hearing in the United States was so improbably low as to establish without any doubt that 
protection procedures on the Coast Guard cutters were ineffective.28 Still, the Reagan policy 
at least acknowledged the law’s requirements. 
However, U.S. policy was soon cast adrift from its legal moorings. In the early 1990s, two 
separate waves of Haitian asylum seekers were diverted to Guantanamo. The first occurred 
in the immediate aftermath of the September 1991 military-led coup against Haiti’s first 
democratically elected president, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. With interdiction numbers 
rising beyond the level that could be safely accommodated and screened on board Coast 
Guard vessels, the George H.W. Bush Administration began transferring interdicted Haitians 
to hastily erected tent camps on the naval base at Guantanamo.29 By November 1991, some 
3600 Haitians were in U.S. military custody,30 and advocates were headed to court to assert 
Haitians’ rights to an adequate refugee screening process with access to counsel, to protection 
from forced return to Haiti, and to admission to the United States to pursue their refugee 
claims after recognition as refugees.31 
The contested sites were international waters, where the Haitians were being interdicted, 
and Guantanamo, where they were being held against their will unless they agreed to return 
to Haiti. By definition, a refugee is unable or unwilling to return to her country. A 
fundamental contradiction of U.S. policy, given the humanitarian nature of the problem, was 
the penal character of the refugee camps on Guantanamo and the harsh conditions of 
                                                                                                                               
 24. Id.  
 25. Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Exec. Order No. 12, 324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109, 48,110 (Sept. 29, 1981). 
 26. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher (CABA), 43 F.3d 1412, 1426 n.16 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(“ ‘Screening’ is a preliminary process during which a determination may be made that the migrant 
has a well-founded fear of persecution if repatriated. If the migrant is preliminarily ascertained to 
have a well-founded fear of persecution if repatriated, the migrant is ‘screened-in.’ If after an 
interview, the determination is made that the migrant does not have such a fear, then the migrant 
is ‘screened-out’ and repatriated.”) (citations omitted). 
 27. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker (Baker III), 953 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 28. Out of 23,000 interdicted Haitians, only eight were allowed to enter the United States to pursue 
their claims. GIL LOESCHER, BEYOND CHARITY: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE GLOBAL 
REFUGEE CRISIS 103 (1993). 
 29. Steven Greenhouse, As Tide of Haitian Refugees Rises, U.S. Uses Cuban Base, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
1994, at A3. 
 30. Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee 
Protection, 26 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 675, 686 (1993).  
 31. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F. 2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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confinement there.32 The author recalls observers noting at the time that the military’s 
template for a “camp” was a prisoner-of-war camp, hardly a suitable model for a civilian 
population with a high percentage of women, children, elderly and persons in poor health. 
The policy of transferring screened-in interdicted Haitians to military custody on 
Guantanamo for a hearing on the merits of their asylum claims had evolved hurriedly in 
response to the increasing numbers fleeing political violence in Haiti. It was not destined to 
last. Less than eight months after the September 1991 coup, with violence continuing and 
departures from Haiti increasing, President Bush announced from his vacation home in 
Maine in May 1992 that henceforth all interdicted Haitians would be returned directly to 
Haiti without any inquiry whatsoever into the reasons they had fled or the risks they feared if 
forced back home.33 The blatant illegality of the so-called Kennebunkport Order re-focused 
legal challenges to the interdiction program, and provided a political opening for presidential 
candidate Bill Clinton to condemn the new Bush policy and promise to reverse it. 
However, upon taking office in January 1993, President Clinton reversed himself by 
maintaining the Bush policy and defending it vigorously in the courts. This proved fortuitous 
for him because in June of that year, the Supreme Court gave the executive branch full 
discretion to act outside the law in dealing with non-citizens in the Caribbean. In Sale v. 
Haitian Centers Council, the Court ruled that because neither domestic nor international law 
applied extraterritorially, the United States did not violate either when it interdicted vessels 
in international waters and immediately returned Haitian asylum seekers to the country 
they had fled.34 The only legal victory advocates could salvage from this disastrous litigation 
was to secure admission to the United States for three hundred Haitians who had been 
screened in on Guantanamo, but had been barred from entry because they were HIV 
positive.35 
With the departure of the HIV positive group for the United States and no new arrivals 
anticipated in Guantanamo after the Supreme Court authorized direct returns to Haiti, it 
appeared in the summer of 1993 that the executive branch had learned all it needed to know 
about the rights of refugees in the Caribbean. The important contours of the legal landscape 
were now clear. The administration had been forced by the courts to allow entry of the three 
hundred HIV positive Haitians, in part because they had been screened in by the 
government’s own preliminary refugee determination interviews. The screened-in Haitians 
therefore had a liberty interest in not being wrongly repatriated, with corresponding due 
process protections.36 Thus, the government had a strong incentive not to conduct any 
                                                                                                                               
 32. See BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED THE 
PRESIDENT—AND WON 269 (2005). 
 33. Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (May 24, 1992). 
 34. 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
 35. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated by order, Stipulated Order 
Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement (Feb. 22, 1994). The story of this aspect of the 
litigation is recounted in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32. 
 36. See CABA, 43 F.3d 1412, 1426 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that in “previous Haitian migrant cases, 
migrants who had been held to have a liberty interest to which due process could attach were 
‘screened-in’ by the government.”); Sale, 823 F. Supp. at 1042; Haitians Ctrs Council v. McNary, 969 
F.2d 1326, 1345 (2d Cir.1992), vacated as moot sub nom. Sale v. Haitians Ctrs Council, 509 U.S. 918 
(1993). 
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screening in the future. Although this would inevitably result in refugees being returned to 
persecution in violation of international law, the Supreme Court had absolved the executive 
branch of any responsibility under domestic law.37 
Meanwhile, after a brief period of relative calm in the Caribbean, continuing political 
turmoil in Haiti fueled a second outpouring. By June 1994, attempts to respond to the new 
wave of asylum seekers without allowing them entry to either the U.S. mainland or to the 
naval base proved ineffectual, and the government resorted once more to incarceration of 
Haitians on Guantanamo. To complicate matters further, an exodus from Cuba began in 
August of that year.38 President Clinton reversed decades of pro-Cuban refugee policy and 
directed that fleeing Cubans be interdicted and taken to Guantanamo.39 Rather than 
acknowledging that persons from either or both countries could be refugees as defined in 
international law, the administration announced that it was not providing asylum in the 
United States to anyone, but was providing merely short-term “temporary protection” on 
Guantanamo after which everyone would be sent home.40 
Having learned its lesson in 1993, the government did not screen either Haitians or 
Cubans in 1994. When the asylum seekers challenged this in court, the Eleventh Circuit cited 
the executive’s “policy decision” not to screen them as fatal to any claim they might have had 
to a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.41 As a matter of U.S. law, the 
government was free to return interdicted Haitians and Cubans from Coast Guard cutters or 
from Guantanamo without any process at all.42 This interpretation provided welcome 
flexibility as Clinton Administration policymakers grappled with the practical challenges of 
dealing with thousands of new asylum seekers. 
However, the scope of the problem soon overwhelmed the military’s capacity and expertise. 
By September 1994, over 31,000 Cubans and nearly 16,000 Haitians were imprisoned on the 
base in deplorable conditions.43 Barbed wire and guard towers surrounded the camps; health 
and safety conditions were grossly inadequate,44 and supplies of potable water and nutritious 
food were insufficient. This surprising failure to meet basic minimum standards had been 
                                                                                                                               
 37. Despite the Court’s pronouncement, the Sale opinion is not dispositive on the international law 
question. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment, 6 INT’L J. REFUGEE 
L. 103, 105 (1994) (“[T]he international obligations of the United States . . . remain unchanged.”). 
 38. MARK P. SULLIVAN & MAUREEN TAFT-MORALES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30628, CUBA: ISSUES 
AND LEGISLATION IN THE 106TH CONGRESS 20 (2001). 
 39. Id. (“Amidst escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, President Clinton abruptly 
changed U.S. migration policy . . . .”).  
 40. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-95-211, CUBA: U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994 CUBAN 
MIGRATION CRISIS 3 (1995). 
 41. CABA, 43 F.3d at 1426–27. 
 42. Id. at 1426 (citing Baker III, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992)). Confusingly, the CABA opinion refers 
to Baker III as HRC II. 
 43. See supra note 5. 
 44. Santiago, supra note 5 (“The most urgent problem, said Gen. Michael Williams, the top-ranking 
officer in charge of all refugee camps, is hygiene. With 3,000 portable toilets, the military does not 
have enough trucks to go around at least once a day to empty them out, he said. So they overflow, 
creating a stench that overtakes the camps and leaving refugees no choice but to use them despite 
the filth.”).  
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2012) 
90 
brought to light not only by reports in the media, but by the military’s own witnesses in the 
earlier litigation concerning the HIV positive Haitians.45 
Thousands of children lacked educational and recreational opportunities, much less any 
specialized intervention to respond to the trauma of their flight and imprisonment. While 
most children were with at least one adult family member, hundreds had left home alone or 
had become separated from adult caregivers during flight.46 Unaccompanied minors are a 
predictable feature of any refugee situation.47 There was ample policy guidance and “best 
practices” on how to meet their needs and protect their rights, most of which was seemingly 
not known and certainly not implemented on Guantanamo during this period. 
In September 1994, the United States led a military intervention authorized by the U.N. 
Security Council to disperse the Cedras regime and return President Aristide to power.48 
Most of the Haitians on Guantanamo promptly chose to return home. With regime change in 
Cuba not an option for the United States, and with public criticism mounting over the 
shocking conditions on Guantanamo, the Clinton Administration began in October 1994 to 
parole into the United States unaccompanied Cuban children under the age of thirteen, as 
well as Cuban families whose children might have suffered severe hardship if they remained 
on Guantanamo.49 The ad hoc, policy-driven nature of the parole program was evident in the 
lack of any stated rationale for limiting it to children under thirteen and in the arbitrariness 
of the “severe hardship” standard. Most telling was the exclusion of the Haitian 
unaccompanied minors from the parole program, a choice upheld by the Eleventh Circuit.50 
As 1994 drew to a close, Guantanamo’s Haitians and Cubans could not have faced a 
starker contrast in their prospects for the new year. The Cubans, who totaled approximately 
20,000,51 correctly guessed that despite stern administration pronouncements to the contrary, 
they would all eventually gain entry to the United States, which they did by May 1995. The 
remaining 8000 Haitians52 continued to press for their asylum claims to be heard, alleging 
that they still feared persecution despite Aristide’s return. Such claims are a normal 
phenomenon as refugee situations wind down. Determination of refugee status for those who 
do not return home voluntarily is a well-established norm of refugee law. The remaining 
Haitians were backed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as 
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well as by many advocacy groups in the United States, in their request for access to a status 
determination process. 
Yet the executive branch continued to assert its complete freedom of action without regard 
to the rights of refugees or of children. Accordingly, in January 1995, the United States 
forcibly returned nearly all of the Haitians, including families with children, without 
determining if their asylum claims were meritorious.53 The cursory evaluations conducted by 
U.S. officials as a prelude to the forced returns were not based on the legal definition of a 
refugee, precisely to avoid the consequences of determining that any Haitians were still in 
need of asylum, or indeed that they had qualified as refugees in the first place. It also served 
as a powerful demonstration that asylum seekers on Guantanamo were outside the reach of 
U.S. law.54 
The only Haitians then remaining on Guantanamo were some 350 unaccompanied 
minors.55 They are normally considered the most vulnerable of refugees, who must be treated 
in accordance with refugee law and the rights of the child. Over the next few months, most of 
them were sent back to Haiti. Although the government conducted an individualized “best 
interests” type of inquiry for each unaccompanied minor, the consistent result in the great 
majority of cases was return to Haiti against the child’s will.56 The minors’ expressions of fear 
of persecution were given little credence, and the existence of close relatives in the United 
States, such as older siblings or aunts and uncles, was not enough to sway decision makers 
into allowing them entry to the United States.57 Although return to Haiti may well have been 
in most of the children’s best interests, the defect of the process was that decisions were based 
entirely on policy considerations, and not on any legal framework, as none was considered to 
apply. While UNHCR and child advocacy groups participated in the Haitian children’s best 
interests determinations in 1995,58 there is no comparable oversight for any refugee children 
currently on Guantanamo. 
To draw the line from the desperate Haitian children in 1995 to Omar Khadr in 2002, it is 
helpful to examine how the courts called upon to vindicate the rights and interests of the 
refugee children, and adults, on Guantanamo enhanced the executive’s power to elude such 
scrutiny and eliminated seemingly any basis for challenging it. 
IV.  Authority without Responsibility 
In establishing a detention center for enemy combatants on Guantanamo, the U.S. 
government sought territory that was under its jurisdiction and control yet beyond the reach 
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of its courts.59 The dubious premise of this approach is that neither domestic nor 
international legal obligations undertaken by the United States are binding on it 
extraterritorially.60 The courts’ enthusiastic embrace of executive power in the 1990s 
provided reassurance to the Office of Legal Counsel in 2001 in concluding that the “great 
weight of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly exercise 
habeas jurisdiction over an alien detained” at Guantanamo.61 
As noted above, the Supreme Court in the 1993 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council opinion 
found interdiction on the high seas followed by direct return without screening for refugee 
status to be permissible under both the Immigration and Nationality Act, and U.S. treaty 
obligations pursuant to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.62 In other 
words, the U.S. obligation of non-refoulement (non-return) does not apply extraterritorially, 
and the asylum seekers interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard had no right not to be 
repatriated to the country of their persecution. Sale has been criticized by eminent 
international law scholars and by UNHCR as substituting migration control policy 
considerations for substantive international law analysis.63 
Similar policy concerns dominated the Eleventh Circuit, which held in Haitian Refugee 
Center v. Baker in 1992 and in Cuban-American Bar Association v. Christopher in 1995 that 
interdicted Haitians on Guantanamo had no rights under domestic immigration law, 
international refugee law, or general principles of international law.64 Therefore persons 
interdicted by the United States before reaching the United States cannot base a right to 
asylum or asylum processing on U.S. or international law. Presence on Guantanamo 
conferred no rights on those whom the United States forcibly conveyed there, because U.S. 
control and jurisdiction does not equate to sovereignty. There would therefore need to be 
extraterritorial application of a domestic statute or a constitutional provision in order to 
vindicate their rights.65 
When Cuban asylum seekers began to be diverted to Guantanamo in 1994, their advocates 
challenged both the fact of their detention and the conditions in the camps on constitutional 
and on international law grounds. The latter included the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and customary international law.66 
When Haitian advocates intervened in the case, the district court ordered the government to 
parole Haitian unaccompanied minors, affording them equal protection with Cuban 
unaccompanied minors. However, the preliminary injunction was quickly dissolved by the 
Eleventh Circuit, citing earlier Haitian refugee litigation as allowing the executive to 
distinguish between aliens on basis of nationality or even race.67 
At the moment of greatest judicial focus on the rights of the Haitian unaccompanied 
minors, it was determined that they had none. This opinion has been characterized as “legally 
flawed” as a matter of international law68 and criticized as placing aliens at Guantanamo 
outside the reach of U.S. law,69 including vulnerable child refugees. 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the lower court’s injunctions and dismissed the complaint,70 
leaving little precedent for future attempts to reintroduce international law principles. Even 
the victory won by the three hundred HIV positive Haitian refugees allowing them to enter 
the United States was vacated by Stipulated Order.71 As a result, the only precedents 
remaining from the Caribbean asylum seekers litigation from the 1990s, Sale and Baker III 
and CABA, stand firmly for the proposition under U.S. law that non-citizens outside the 
United States are outside the reach of U.S. and international law. 
Given the illegality of U.S. interdiction practice, the shameful conditions in the camps for 
asylum seekers taken against their will to Guantanamo, the unlawful coerced return of 
Haitians resisting repatriation after President Aristide was reinstated, and the spectacle of 
Cuban children being ushered onto flights to triumphant celebrations in Miami while Haitian 
children were forced to board Coast Guard cutters back to the dangerous squalor of their 
home country, the Eleventh Circuit’s callous condescension in the Cuban-American Bar 
Association opinion is breathtaking. Revisited today, with the painful hindsight of just how 
much uglier Guantanamo would become seven years later, what is most striking is the court’s 
airy reliance on American traditions and goodwill in place of legal rights, as if America’s best 
traditions are not about rights and America’s goodwill does not encompass extending those 
rights to others. Judge Stanley F. Birch wrote: 
 While we have determined that these migrants are without legal rights . . . we 
observe that they are nonetheless beneficiaries of the American tradition of 
humanitarian concern and conduct. . . . While these migrants are faced with difficult 
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conditions . . . . the goodwill of their military rescuers and caretakers will hopefully 
sustain and reassure them in their quest for a better life.72 
V.  Comparing Conclusions on the Role of International Law 
Professor Wilson’s project of exploring the intersections and tensions between human 
rights and humanitarian law as those two doctrinal areas played out in Khadr’s situation, 
with particular focus on how issues regarding his youth were addressed by the many 
tribunals involved,73 resonates with the story of the litigation on behalf of Haitian child 
asylum seekers in the 1990s. Wilson concludes that human rights and humanitarian law 
almost never interacted in the judicial decisions of United States courts regarding Omar 
Khadr. He suggests both obvious as well as subtle reasons why courts avoided international 
law issues relating to children. 
The most obvious reason was the context of vengeance in which these decisions were 
made.74 A second reason was that Khadr and the other children in armed conflict were part of 
a larger group, which presented a number of extremely complex legal issues.75 Third, Wilson 
points out the general antipathy of United States courts to human rights or humanitarian 
law as a result of discomfort, usually borne of inexperience.76 He argues that both the Bush 
and Obama Administrations played a role in this by further blurring relevant international 
law definitions to justify strong executive discretion.77 A fourth reason for judicial avoidance 
was simply, and conveniently, the passage of time: by resolutely looking only forward, courts 
were able to dodge the issues that arose from Khadr’s initial detention and conditions of 
confinement in Bagram and on Guantanamo.78 
Wilson’s analysis provides a helpful framework for drawing comparisons between Khadr 
and his predecessors on Guantanamo. In that light, it is revealing to ask when and how 
human rights and refugee law were employed in decisions of U.S. courts regarding the 
Haitian unaccompanied minors. The answer is almost never. As Wilson argues, there are 
both obvious as well as subtle reasons why courts avoided international law issues relating to 
refugee children. 
Context is key. Vengeance was not, of course, a relevant factor among the challenges faced 
by U.S. policymakers in responding to Caribbean refugee flows in the late 20th century, and 
by U.S. judges in assessing their legality. There was, however, a similarly dominant context—
an exaggerated concern with migration control in the Caribbean—which marginalized 
international law and distorted judicial decision-making. The focus of the greatest anxiety 
was Haitians. The U.S. overreaction to a tiny number of asylum seekers in comparison to 
world refugee numbers suggests a moral panic among many Americans. The role of racism in 
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the disparate treatment of Haitians in U.S. immigration law has been noted by advocates79 
and some courts,80 as well as the depiction of Haitians as carriers and even originators of a 
terrifying disease.81 While it is easy to be underwhelmed by Goldstein’s hagiographic 
narrative of Harold Koh’s legal victory on behalf of the three hundred Haitian refugees with 
HIV/AIDS,82 it is also difficult (fortunately) to recall the fear and hatred aroused in America 
in the 1990s by the sufferers of this disease, particularly when they were poor, black, and so 
foreign that they did not even speak English. 
Preoccupation with migration control explains many of the policy contortions of a series of 
U.S. administrations. Writing after the first wave of Haitians on Guantanamo, a refugee 
expert noted that: “The development of the United States repatriation policy on the political 
front is noteworthy. The Bush Administration’s policies towards the Haitian refugees evolved 
by fits and starts, and was influenced by election-year politics, court challenges, and a 
growing number of asylum seekers.”83 President Clinton’s reversal on the policy of 
interdiction and direct return reminded many observers that one reason he lost his re-election 
bid for the governorship of Arkansas was his unhappy experience with the Mariel Cubans 
whom President Carter had paroled into the country. Keenly aware of public fears, a context 
which they helped create, policymakers in the 1990s cast about for new “tools” to respond to 
what was generally referred to, notwithstanding the small numbers involved, as a migration 
emergency or a refugee crisis, without employing the legal framework designed for just such a 
purpose. 
A second reason for the absence of international law on refugee children in dealing with 
the Haitian unaccompanied minors was that, like Khadr, they were part of a larger group 
which presented a number of other complex legal issues. Wilson points out that the 
opportunity for raising such claims in Khadr’s case was often overshadowed by broader or 
seemingly more urgent issues, with the telling detail that in one legal brief there was room 
                                                                                                                               
 79. For a contemporary account of a speech by Cheryl Little naming the discriminatory treatment of 
Haitians a clear case of racism, see Rajath Shourie, Students Train to Aid Haitians: Law School 
Hosts Educational Program to Help Refugees, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 9, 1992), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1992/3/9/students-train-to-aid-haitians-papproximately/. 
 80. In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), District Court Judge James 
Lawrence King issued a lengthy opinion, which found that the manner in which INS treated the 
more than 4000 Haitian plaintiffs “violated the Constitution, the immigration statutes, 
international agreements, INS regulations and INS operating procedures. It must stop.” Id. at 452. 
He also said: 
The Haitians allege that the actions of INS constitute impermissible discrimination on 
the basis of national origin. They have proven their claim. This court cannot close its eyes, 
however, to a possible underlying reason why these plaintiffs have been subjected to 
intentional “national origin” discrimination. The plaintiffs are part of the first substantial 
flight of black refugees from a repressive regime to this country. All of the plaintiffs are 
black. In contrast, for example, only a relatively small percent of the Cuban refugees who 
have fled to this country are black. Prior to the most recent Cuban exodus, all of the Cubans 
who sought political asylum in individual 8 C.F.R. Sec. 108 hearings were granted asylum 
routinely. None of the over 4,000 Haitians processed during the INS “program” at issue in 
this lawsuit were granted asylum. No greater disparity can be imagined. 
 Id. at 451 (citations omitted). 
 81. See PAUL FARMER, AIDS AND ACCUSATION: HAITI AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF BLAME 5 (2d ed. 2006). 
 82. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32. 
 83. Frelick, supra note 30, at 678. 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (2012) 
96 
only for one footnote to cover the international law arguments with respect to children in 
armed conflict.84 
The legal, not to mention policy, issues involved in interdiction and detention on 
Guantanamo were similarly multi-faceted, including: the authority and responsibility of the 
United States when it took action in international waters, the differing causes of flight for the 
Cubans and the Haitians, the operating assumption that most if not all Haitians were 
economic migrants, the adequacy of the refugee screening processes on board the Coast 
Guard vessels and on Guantanamo, the significance of having been screened in, screened out 
or not screened at all, the lack of access to counsel, the prevalence of gender-based violence at 
all stages of the Haitians’ journey, the legal status of Guantanamo, the conditions in the 
camps, the impact of the HIV positive Haitian refugees’ health status, and the forced return 
of thousands of Haitians from Guantanamo in early 1995. Not until the Cuban children 
began to be paroled into the United States in the fall of 1994 did the Haitian unaccompanied 
minors get their day in court. Although the outcome of complete disregard for their rights 
might have been the same regardless of the sequence of litigation, it certainly did not help 
that international law had been firmly rejected by the Supreme Court before the Haitian 
children had an opportunity to be heard. 
The third reason Wilson identifies is U.S. courts’ lack of engagement with human rights 
and humanitarian law, and the deleterious role played by both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations in this regard.85 This is certainly the most salient insight on human rights 
and refugee law in the 1990s Guantanamo litigation. In the face of overreaching and 
obfuscation on the part of the executive branch, the appellate courts seemed utterly unwilling 
or unable to grasp basic principles of international law, even as they overturned more 
sophisticated lower court opinions or outvoted their own dissenting members. Indeed, the 
view that international law is inapplicable or unhelpful became an important part of the 
context of the problem, and the two elements were mutually reinforcing. 
As one example of strategically blurred definitions, U.S. government sources then and now 
consistently refer to Haitians as “migrants.” While this is not incorrect as a general term used 
in everyday language, it has no meaning under the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act, 
which employs the terms “immigrant” and “non-immigrant” for non-citizen permanent 
residents and temporary visitors, respectively. More importantly, “migrant” avoids the word 
“refugee” which is defined in nearly identical terms in U.S. and international law and which 
imposes the legal obligation not to return such a person to the risk of persecution.86 “Migrant” 
also avoids “asylum seeker,” a widely used term for those who are applying, or would like to 
be able to apply, for refugee status. Since States do not know whether an asylum seeker is in 
fact a refugee before her status is recognized through some sort of process, they are prohibited 
from returning her to danger until it is established that she is not in need of protection.87 
Since a “migrant” has no claim on the United States while an “asylum seeker” who might well 
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be a “refugee” does, it is helpful in diluting the impact of international refugee law to call 
Haitians “migrants.” 
In a variation on this theme, President Clinton referred to Haitians as “illegal refugees”88 
as though the adjective would cancel out the noun. Rather, it served as probably intended—to 
confuse the issue as there is no such legal category—while implying at best that Haitians 
disregard the law and at worst that they pose a danger to the public. 
The executive branch deliberately circumvented not only legal terminology but also legal 
norms. The “best interests of the child” standard was the stated basis for Clinton 
Administration decisions about the Cuban and Haitian children on Guantanamo.89 Yet this 
was transparently not so, since all the Cuban children were paroled into the United States, 
and almost all the Haitian children were sent home. The “nationality of the child” was the de 
facto standard employed. 
Another legal standard distorted beyond recognition by the executive branch was the 
prohibition on refoulement, the forced return of refugees. In late 1994, the United States 
wanted to rid Guantanamo of the approximately 8000 Haitians who had not repatriated 
voluntarily in the aftermath of President Aristide’s return to power and who wished to apply 
for asylum in the United States. The lawful approach in this circumstance would have been to 
determine which of the Haitians met the refugee definition, and return only those who did 
not. Instead, the Clinton Administration crafted an entirely novel legal standard, ascertained 
that none of the Haitians met it, and then returned them all. Since none of the Haitians had 
ever been assessed against the actual refugee definition, the government was able to deny 
that it had forcibly returned any refugees.90 
The Supreme Court was willing and even eager to accept the executive branch’s re-
imagining of the international refugee regime as applicable only inside the United States.91 
Justice Blackmun expressed his dismay at the sheer audacity of the Bush and Clinton 
Administrations, and the rest of his own colleagues, in these terms: “What is extraordinary in 
this case is that the Executive, in disregard of the law, would take to the seas to intercept 
fleeing refugees and force them back to their persecutors—and that the Court would strain to 
sanction that conduct.”92 
Similarly, Judge Hatchett’s dissent in Baker III expressed his incredulity at the majority’s 
embrace of the fiction of extraterritoriality: 
The government makes the “outside the United States” argument, and the majority 
accepts it, although everyone in this case agrees that agencies of the United States 
captured the refugees and are holding them on United States vessels and leased 
territory. Moreover, the majority accepts this argument although everyone in the case 
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agrees that the refugees are being prevented from reaching the shores of the 
continental United States. The majority accepts a pure legal fiction . . . .93 
The lack of independent analysis may be due in part, as Wilson suggests, to the courts’ 
uncertain grasp of international law and lack of familiarity with basic principles of treaty 
interpretation, shortcomings on full view in the Sale opinion. In Sale, the majority engaged in 
a lengthy and largely irrelevant discussion of the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
which served to establish chiefly that “the Court’s knowledge of the negotiating history . . . 
appears both superficial and selective.”94 Another extended portion of the majority opinion is 
given over to a discussion of possible meanings of the French verb refouler (in English: to 
return). So labored is this analysis that a prominent English refugee law scholar was 
provoked to comment that the Court “is not at ease with foreign words.”95 Perhaps revealing 
similar discomfort in fewer words, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of an argument based on 
customary international law by asserting simply that it “is meritless and does not warrant 
discussion.”96 
The final problem that Wilson identified in his analysis of Khadr’s case was the passage of 
time.97 After Khadr’s status as a minor had been ignored by courts long enough, it went 
away. A comparable self-interested inertia was evident in U.S. dealings with the Haitian 
unaccompanied minors. As long as they were children, the United States did not return them 
to Haiti without a “best interests of the child” assessment that included family tracing. Once 
they turned eighteen, they could be and were returned without the assessment. 
My closing recommendation concerns the value of reflecting on the failure of litigation for 
both Khadr and the Haitian kids. This is not a reflection on the skill or dedication of the 
litigators. It is instead a failure on the part of the courts to engage with international law, for 
the reasons Professor Wilson identified. Examples of judicial ignorance or hostility such as 
the ones cited above are all too easy to find. Nor is the problem limited to the courts, as 
evidenced by recent state law initiatives to ban judicial use of foreign, international or 
religious law. We face a very serious challenge as U.S. lawyers to inform ourselves about 
international law, to educate our judges, and to call our policymakers to account. This 
symposium is an encouraging example of the work to be done. 
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